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NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants

(Plaintiffs) seek to recover their rights

in real property and declare null and void, for lack of consideration and duress, an agreement between them and Respondents

(De-

fendants) by which Respondents claim an interest in the property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District court in and for Salt Lake County, Judge
Ernest F. Baldwin sitting without a jury, rendered judgment for
Respondents

(Defendants) and awarded them the disputed real property

interests, subject to certain encumbrances.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appell an·ts

seek reversal of the lower court's judgment

together with certain findings and conclusions on which the judgment
is based, with the resulting effect that Respondents shall have
no interest in the subject real property.

In the alternative,

Appellants seek a remand and a new trial before a jury, a right
erroneously denied by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For ease of reference, citations to the trial transcript
will refer to the transcript page numbers as "Tr.

Other parts

of the record will be cited "R.
Prior to 1973, Appellants
and FREDA N. GASSER, his wife,

(Plaintiffs) JOSEPH S. GASSER

(for convenience sometimes referred
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to collectively herein as the "GASSERS") owned 42.5% of a mobi!r
home park in Layton, Davis County, Utah, known as "Hillgate Ten,
The remaining interests were owned by a Smith Family (15%) and,
Dr. Skankey

(42.5%).

The interest was subject to a mortgage in

the amount of $139,000.00 to Dr. Skankey as security for othero:
tions, and an additional mortgage of $225,000.00 to a gr?up head;
by Dr. Skankey

(referred to in the record as the "Skankey group"i

as security for further indebtedness of the GASSERS.

The $225,J:

was secured as well by a mortgage on an apartment house owned by
the GASSERS in Missoula, Montana along with other securities.(Sei
Tr. 29, ·104 and 122 and Ex. 18-D).

The Hillgate Terrace was sub;c

also to a first mortgage to another financial institution, not
in issue here.

(Tr. 106).

In order to obtain funds with which to pay the Skankey
group and Dr. Skankey, to purchase the interests of Smith and Sko:
in Hillgate Terrace, and to make improvements thereon, Mr.

~~D

began negotiating in early 1973 for a loan of at least $1 millior
against Hillgate Terrace.

His preliminary investigations i~~~

that the money supply was tight and the loan may have to carry a:
addi tiona! guarantor.

Mr. GASSER approached Defendant DAVID

il.

HORNE who indicated a willingness to guaranty or co-sign the loa:
GASSER and HORNE made a joint application to Prudential Federal
Savings

(Ex. 14-D) which was rejcted, and thereafter made applic

to American Savings & Loan Association for a loan, concerning

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~hlch

the additional relevant events occurred.

Subsequently,

Ii

HORNE demanded 50% interest in Hillgate Terrace as a condition of
co-signing on the note and mortgage.
by Joseph L. Henriod, Esq.
i~

A draft agreement \vas prepared

in early April 1973 (Ex. 4-P) incorporat-

the terms agreed to by HORNE and GASSER.

In substance, if

de:

GASSER could complete the loan in 60 days without the necessity
of HORNE's signature, HORNE would have no interest in the property;
otherwise, HORNE would co-sign the note and mortgage and receive
a 50% interest.
ee

During the time HORNE and GASSER were negotiating with
~erican

Savings & Loan, and GASSER was seeking means of concluding

a loan without HORNE's signature, a foreclosure action was underway
in Montana by which Hr. Henriod, or Montana counsel at his direction,
sought to collect funds due Dr. Skankey or the Skankey Group.
287).

Mr. Henriod represented the Skankey group.

(Tr.

Both previously

and subsequently, he represented DAVID M. HORNE on other matters.
o:

ITr. 319).

Although he claimed not to represent HORNE in the negoti-

ations with GASSER here in dispute, he drafted and revised the
agreements in question and discussed all matters pertaining to
HO~E's interests either with GASSER directly or with GASSER's counsel,

James L. Baker, Jr.

(Tr. 290 and 301; Ex. 17-D).

GASSER and HORNE subsequently renegotiated their terms
after American Savings

&

Loan committed a loan which might be resold
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on a 90% participation to Equitable Savings
Oregon.

Loan in Portland,

&

In substance, HORNE agreed to permit the GASSERS to have

the mortgage and the Hillgate Terrace if the loan could be soN
to Equitable with only the GASSERS signing on the loan.
HORNE demanded his 50% of Hillgate Terrace.

Othen:is,

HORNE would not be

obligated to pay any other consideration for that 50% interest.
During the final week of concluding the American Savir1;o
&

Loan deal beginning June 25, 1973, the GASSERS objected to s1gr.
for~ ~

the HORNE Agreement which had been redrafted in several
Mr. Henriod

(Exs. 5-P, 6-P and 22-D) because they did not like

the limitations which required selling the loan to Equitable
30 days as the only condition which would render HORNE's
unnecessary.

wU~

signat~:'

Mr. Henriod advised the GASSERS that if they did no:

sign the agreement, he would complete his foreclosure for the
Skankey group.

(Tr.

336).

The GASSERS felt they would "lose

everything" by such action,

(Tr. 174) and finally, even against'

advice of their own counsel

(Tr. 226) ,they executed the HOR~

agreement.

That agreement is the principal issue in this appea:,

together with the circumstances inducing execution of the sue.
On or about June 2 9 , 19 7 3, the loan with American savi·
was closed with a special escrow set up through Ralph Marsh, E~
of Backman, Backman & Clark.

Out of the proceeds of the ~an~

actually closed, the Skankey Group was paid approximately $40Ll
(Ex. 7-P).

In a simultaneous transaction, the Montana

pro~rt 0

were sold and Dr. Skankey and the Skankey Group paid all monic'
Sponsored
by the S.J.
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a nctc and trust deed with related documents signed only by the
GASSERS, the other having a note and trust deed signed by both
the GASSERS and the HORNES.

(Tr.

205).

The trust deed signed by the

GASSERS was actually recorded on July 2, 1973 and the documents
signed by the HORNES are still in escrow.

Thus, under the operative

documents, the HORNES never did assume liability on any note or
wrtgage.

Equitable declined to purchase the loan after it was

closed by American Savings, but as of January 22, 1974, the loan
·was sold on a 75% participation basis to Far West Savings & Loan,
Portland, Oregon.

American Savings had earlier indicated a willing-

ness to grant the GASSERS a loan without the HORNES, at a higher
interest rate

(Tr. 124,239), but "backed down" from that offer

prior to June 2 9 , 19 7 3 when Mr. Henr iod and Mr. HORNE made known
their demands for the 50% interest for HORNE and made it appear
"too messy" for American Savings to deal further with GASSERS on
another basis.

(Tr.

242).

By reason of the duress felt by the GASSERS as well as
the apparent lack of consideration in the HORNE Agreement, Mr.
GASSER initiated this lawsuit to prevent the escrow agent from
recording the deed which would have conveyed the 50% interest to
ilie HORNES, and to determine further the rights of the parties.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HORNE AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERA':
The HORNE Agreement as a written document requires ini:
coll\Il\ent because it is manifest in the record in several
forms.

differe~:

Exhibit 4-P was the first draft, never executed, but im>::

tant as factual background in showing the state of mind of the
parties and other circumstances whilenegotiating the subsequent
versions.

Exhibit 4-P did not consider the undisputed second mor:

gage to' Mr. GASSER's father which is mentioned in handwritten inti
lineation in two of the executed versions.

It also said nothing

about escrowing any documents, nor did it mention the proposed s;:
to Equitable Savings

&

Loan as later defined.

The record eviden::

considerable discussion about the change in Paragraph 3 of Exhib::

C<

4-P by which " . . . in the event GASSER is successful in rernovin:
HORNE from liability

" was changed to use "eliminating" i:·

stead of "removing".

Thus the intent of the parties was evi~n~

that HORNE may never become liable for the loan.

WE

Consequently,

it would not be necessary to "remove" a liability which did not
exist, but rather to "eliminate" the need for HORNE to beco~ 1~
th
Exhibits 5-P and 2 2-D are identical except that 5-P de'
not show the signature of Mrs. GASSER.

These versions, like t~

by

lo

others, were prepared by Mr. Henriod and typed in his office aR
al
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conference with Mr. HORNE and Mr. GASSER.

Exhibit 6-P, the other

manifestation of the HORNE Agreement, does not refer to the $65,000
second mortgage to Mr. GASSER's father, but all parties admitted
iL

that no dispute exists with respect thereto.

(Tr. 304).

It appears

that 6-P was made operative because it shows the acknowledgement of
Ralph Marsh as escrow agent on June 29, 1973 and also evidences
on the first page that it was document #2 on that date, presumably
a convenient reference during the closing.

nor:·

lnt:
ng

But 6-P has more critical

differences, as compared with 5-P and 22-D, which relate to the
intent of the parties as well as execution inducement circumstances.
In Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 6-P, the clause " . . . HORNE
shall receive no interest in said property by reason thereof

en:'
ibi:

appears in context with the sale to Equitable.

concerning sale by American Savings to no party other than Equitable,
appears the phrase "

. to the extent GASSER is able to control

the actions of American Savings and Loan,
~nee

In Paragraph 4,

.

These changes

were inserted at the suggestion of James L. Barker, Jr., counsel for
the GASSERS, in his discussions with Mr. Henriod, \vho appeared to
be representing HORNE.

(Tr. 145-146).

Although Mr. Barker advised

the GASSERS against signing the agreement (Tr. 226) , he recognized
the pressures they were ·under and thus attempted to gain some relief
by not tying the GASSERS to actions of American in marketing the
loan elsewhere, over which they may have no control.

His changes

also emphasize the intent that the HORNES would have no interest
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the property in the event a sale of the loan with the GASSERS'
signatures alone was successful.

Exhibit 6-P is the only

Ag~e~

version showing the changes requested by Mr. Barker.
The perspective will be broadened in a later demonstrat.
that HORNE did not become liable on the note as a matter of fact
(and law) after execution of the HORNE-GASSER Agreement and clos:
of the loan by GASSER.

We argue here the elementary concer:>t tha:

the Agreement lacked consideration ab initio.

Of striking signi-

ficance in the Agreement is the fact that HORNE makes no promise
or covenant whatever!

The last "Whereas" clause recites that

HORNE is willing, under certain conditions, to provide financial
backing for the loan.

That clause does not represent a specific

covenant, although the agreement to per form some unarticulated
act might be inferred from the context and explained by parol
evidence.

Even that inference is questionable when it is rememb2:

that HORNE joined with GASSER on an earlier application to Prude:·
tial

(Ex. 14-D), but never did intend to become liable to Prude:r

tial. (Tr. 357).

Perhaps he intended no liability at American Sa

either, but in any event, he achieved just that.

Without an ~

covenant by HORNE, the consideration reci·ted of "mutual promises
-I

agreements of the Parties" must be interpreted as showing ~
tion.

Only GASSER makes promises in the Agreement.

"mutual" promise of HORNE.

There isM

In undisputed testimony, HORNE ~N
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~SSER

that he would not take compensation for signing a note

and mortgage if he could get released within a reasonable time.
(Tr. 112).

With that intent, HORNE made no promise even to become

obligated, and in fact, never did.
there is no consideration.

Without mutuality of obligation,

On its very face, therefore, the Agree-

ment is unenforceable and of no effect.
As a result of the foregoing,
No. 5 (R. 228)

the lower court's Finding

is erroneous in finding that HORNE agreed to become

personally liable on the $1,050,000.00 note to American Savings.
fur~er,

Finding No. 15 (R. 230)

is erroneous in its statement that

the Agreement was supported by fair and adequate consideration.
This Court, on appeal, must find and conclude that the Agreement
lacked consideration ab initio and did not subsequently develop
any consideration which would support GASSER's promises.

The lower

court's judgment should be reversed on that ground.
Even if the Court construed HORNE's actual signature on
the alternative note as extrinsic evidence to the Agreement supporting
an inference that HORNE promised to become liable, then the Court
must also consider external circumstances concerning whether HORNE
~became liable.

In the first instance, a lack of promise

created a lack of consideration.

In the second instance, although

a Promise may have been inferred, there was a failure of consideration when HORNE did not actually become liable on the operative
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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documents.

The lower court's willingness to give effect to a cc·

tract which either lacked or failed for consideration, or both,
cannot be upheld.
The Court will observe from the record that the note::
Trust Deed from the GASSERS

(without the HORNES'

actually sold to Far West Savings

&

signatures)~~

Loan under a participation b;

which American retained 25% and the servicing. (Ex. 1-P, Tr. 246,
251).

After the closing through escrow on June 29, 1973, that

Trust Deed was recorded on July 2, 1973.
ment between American and Far West

The participation agree

(part of Ex. 1-P) clearly evJc,,

in Paragraph VI that no loan could be sold which was in default.
American represented that the payments were current, but such
could not be so without payments from the borrower.

The record

is clear, however, that HORNE was never asked to pay and never d:
pay any portion of the payments, even as of the date of trial H
months after the sale to Far West.

Also, the participation cert:

ficate clearly indicates that JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR. was the pri:
debtor, and no mention is made of HORNE.

At no time did HORNE

attempt to assert that he was liable with GASSER on the note, fi
the record is devoid of any suggestion that he contacted Americ:
Savings or Far West after the loan was closed and sold, to asser:
his interest in the property and his liability on the note.

~

his own admission, HORNE never was billed for any payment. I~·
361).

GASSER received all the coupon books and arranged to ma::,
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the payments.

(Tr. 74).

Consequently, HORNE did not consider

himself liable on the note and, in fact, he did not become liable
in law.

Without such liability on HORNE's part, there was abso-

lutely no consideration for the agreement of the GASSERS to convey
the 50% interest.

HORNE is attempting to obtain an interest for

which he does not pay.
Although some confusion existed during the trial regarding
a~ission

of testimonial evidence concerning sale of the GASSER

loan to Far West, i t is clear from the testimony of Mr. Bradshaw,
President of American Savings, that the GASSER note and trust deed
(shown with loan statement signed by the GASSERS only as part of
Exhibit 7-P) were sold to Far West without documents signed by
theHORNES.

(Tr. 246).

the GASSER note

In addition, Exhibit 1-P evidences that

(without the HORNES) was sold to Far West, and

Hr. Nielsen, counsel for HORNE at trial, stipulated that Exhibit
1-P could be admitted as evidence for the facts therein stated.
(Tr. 6).

The applicable law, viewed against the facts argued above,
supports Appellants' conclusions.

It is well established that con-

sideration is an essential element of any valid contract and that
a promise which is not supported by consideration is not enforceable.

See Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 535 P.2d 880

l97S); Malcoff v.

(Kan.

Coyier, 484 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. 1971); Powers Res-

~t, Inc. v. Garrison, 465 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1970); McGrath v.
SponsoredConst.
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
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231 (Ore. 1969); White v. Saby,

260 P.2d 1116

(Mont.

1964). Here

over, although the general rule is that almost any benefit to a
promisor

or detriment to a promisee, however slight, can consti-

tute consideration, there must be some benefit, profit, or advar,tage to the promisor or
the promisee.

~

loss, detriment or inconvenience to

See Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291

Kadish v. Kallof, 414 P.2d 193
309 P. 2d 147

(Alaska 1972);

(Ariz. 1966); Blonder v. Gentile,

(Calif. 1966).

A recent Utah case, Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 11
Utah 2d 433
courts.

(1961) adopts the general position followed by other

The Manwill case involved an action on an alleged agree·

ment to repay to the Plaintiff the amount of payments he had mac;
on the Defendant's behalf.

The court held that in order for a

contract to be binding, each party must be bound to give legal
consideration to the other by benefitting him or suffering a leg;
detriment at his request.
consideration.

Mere moral obligation is not a valid

In the case at bar, HORNE did not suffer a

leg~.

detriment and GASSER did not gain a legal benefit, either in the
language of the Agreement as written or in the actual implementa
tion of the loan from American Savings which was contemplated
the Agreement.

b]

HORNE did not promise to pay, give up or other.:''

suffer anything under the terms of the Agreement.

When the loa''

was finally made and also when it was sold to a participati~
institution, only the GASSERS were bound by the documents.
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did not promise to become and did not actually become liable on
the note.

GASSER would have no recourse against HORNE for payment

by contribution.

Neither American Savings nor Far West Savings

had any legal right to impose liability on HORNE for payment.
Indeed, they did not intend to rely on HORNE and have not actually
done so; HORNE has not paid and has not been requested t6 pay one
penny toward the loan.

Yet he tries to rely on this lack of consider a-

tion as a basis for recovering 50% of a mobile home park!

POINT II

THE HORNE AGREEHENT IS NULL AND VOID AS HAVING BEEN EXECUTED
BY THE GASSERS UNDER DURESS.
This part of Appellants' argument is both more difficult
to explain and more sensitive.

Without intending to reflect ad-

versely on acts of opposing counsel, we are nevertheless forced
to include a description of the performance of Hr. Henriod as part

of the circumstances constituting duress.

Ordinarily, neither the

court nor opposing counsel >vould have any right to tell another
attorney whom he must represent.

Yet it is part of Appellants'

claim here that Mr. Henriod either represented the HORNES as their
counsel in the GASSER transactions, or acted in such manner as to
lead the GASSERS and their counsel, Mr. Barker, to believe such
~~esentation existed.

By objective evidence later detailed,

the record supports the proposition that both HORNE and Mr. Henriod
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led the GASSERS to believe Mr. Henriod had authority to bindfu
HORNES.

Under the evidence, the HORNES must be so bound by acto

of Mr. Henriod.
The duress which should invalidate the HORNE Agreement
is briefly summarized as follows:

1.

Hr. Henriod, acting on behalf of the HORNES, threa:

ened the GASSERS that if they did not sign the HORNE Agreement,
the Skankey foreclosure on property of the GASSERS would be completed;
2.

Mr. Henriod and HORNE threatened American Savings

i

Loan that they must go through with the GASSER-HORNE loan or suf'
litigation at a time when American may have granted a loan with
higher interest rate to the GASSERS alone without the HORNES and wi!
a pre-committed sale; and
3.

Mr. Henriod had an unconscionable conflict of~~

in representing the Skankey Group and HORNE through

at leastpa

of the GASSER transactions.
The detailed factual and legal arguments to follow01
amplify Appellants' contentions that the facts in the record suf
port Appellants 'positions as summarized above and do not supporl
the lower court's Findings No. 12
not represent HORNE), No. 14

(claiming that Plaintiffs were not

induced, coerced or intimidated)
ants were not guilty

(claiming that Mr. Henriod dil

and No. 15

(claiming that ~~

of other wrongful or improper conduct)· (R.
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Subject to later discussions of certain legal and evi~ntiary
G~SERS

points, the detailed evidence concerning duress on the
is demonstrated by the following recapitulation:
1.

The so-called Skankey Group was represented by Mr.

Henriod (Tr. 290), but Dr. Skankey personally was represented also
by Richard Harris, Esq.

of June 20, 1973
(Tr.

(Tr.

(in Mr. Marsh's escrow office in- the meeting

76), and according to Mr. Henriod's testimony.

345).
2.

Early in the HORNE-GASSER negotiations, Mr. HORNE

told Mr. GASSER, in undisputed testimony, that Mr. Henriod was his
attorney.

(Tr. 7 8) .

Thereafter, Mr. Henriod admittedly prepared

the draft agreement, Exhibit 4-P

(Tr. 292) and commenced discussions

with HORNE and GASSER resulting in 5-P, 6-P and 22-D (Tr. 86).
Although GASSER and HORNE commenced initial discussions without
the assistance of Mr. Barker for GASSER and Mr. Henriod for HORNE,
it was only natural that the definitive agreements would be prepared
and reviewed by the respective counsel.

HORNE turned to Mr. Henriod

for this purpose because Mr. Henriod had represented him on prior
matters (Tr. 319) and obviously commenced representing him in connection with this lawsuit after it was filed (Tr. 331).
3.

During a meeting at Mr. Henriod's office attended

by HORNE and GASSER on June 27, 1973, HORNE demanded his 50% interest

in Hillgate Terrace under circumstances which caused GASSER to
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walk out of the meeting rather than state what he really felt.r:
84).

Later, Mr. Henriod told GASSER that he should work things

with HORNE.

(Tr. 86).

Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 22-D followed those

discussions.
4.

Even though Mr. Barker's position as counsel foc

GASSER was known, Mr. Barker permit ted GASSER to speak directly
to Mr. Henriod on most occasions without Mr. Barker's intercess:'
as counsel.
5.

(Tr. 10 3) .
The squeeze-play on the GASSERS between Mr. Henr:c:

Skankey clients and his HORNE clients began gradually and is de:
strated most aptly by Exhibit 17-D.

On May 7, 1973, Mr. Henrioo

wrote Mr. Barker a letter concerning the HORNE-GASSER Agreement
(presumably the draft, Exhibit 4-P) and complained of lack of
communication in working out details before closing the loan.
Mr. Henriod therein stated, "We need to prepare escrow instructi'
which are going to meet your approval and your clients
and also mine and my clients

approval.

approva:

We also need these agro

ments circulated to obtain my client's approval."

Notwi thstanoJ

inconsistent use of apostrophes on the word "client", the last
use as "client's" suggests that he is talking about HORNE rathe:
than the Skankey Group.

Furthermore, Exhibit 18-D, the Skankey

settlement agreement, had been executed some time earlier, a~
it was not necessary for Mr. Barker to review that again.

The

inescapable conclusion is that Mr. Henriod, on behalf of his 2
seeking
Mr.of Museum
Barker
relative
HORNE,
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6.
GASSER

Although Mr. Henriod continued to put pressure on

to pay Skankey and the Skankey Group after November 1972

(Tr. 112-113), yet the communications between GASSER and Mr. Henriod
~re

somewhat tension-free until June 11, 1973.

On that date, Mr.

Henriod summoned GASSER to his office and delivered a letter of
demand (Ex. 16-D) by which the obligations to the Skankey Group
~d

to be paid by June 25, 1973.

(Tr. 121).

This demand accelerated

the squeeze-play.
7.
~~iod

During a conversation between Mr. Barker and Mr.

after submission of Mr. Henriod's draft resulting in Exhibit

5-P, on or after June 25, 1973, Mr. Barker told Mr. Henriod that

the agreements were unfair and did not represent what HORNE had
earlier agreed to.

Mr. Henriod responded that his client (HORNE)

had changed his mind.
record.

This testimony remains undisputed in the

These events also form part of the entire context wherein

:1r. llenriod was acting solely for Mr. HORNE's interests in conversations with GASSER and Mr. Barker, in matters which were of no
direct concern to his Skankey clients.

Mr. Henriod would not have

reason to discuss HORNE's matters with Mr. Barker if he were not
purporting to represent HORNE.
8.

When the closing was imminent and the HORNE Agreement

~d not yet been finalized as of June 26, 1973, Mr. Henriod contacted
~~E in San Francisco and arranged for the HORNES and the GASSERS
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to meet the next day to complete the Agreements.

(Tr. 301).

HOP

confirmed Mr. Henriod' s testimony in that regard in language whi
tainly

sounds as if an attorney and his client are conversing:

"Q

A

Q

(By Mr. Halgren)
Mr. Horne, when you were contacted
by Mr. Henriod sometime on the 26th day of June
1973 by telephone do you recall anything that was
discussed between you and Mr. Henriod at that time?
Yes.
Would you tell me what was said?
agr~·

A

Mr. Henriod asked me if I was ready to sign the
ment that had been prepared sometime earlier.

Q

And what did you tell him?

A

I told him that it was an entirely different time,
that I didn't know if I was prepared to sign it or
not; that I would be back in Salt Lake the next day
and we would discuss it."
(Tr. 359).
9.

In conversation between Mr. Marsh, escrow agent,an:

Henriod during the week of June 25th, Mr. Henriod stated that GAS

had accused him of a conflict of interest in representing bo~~
Skankeys and the HORNES.

Mr. Henriod' s comment was:

"I guess I·

have a conflict but we will have to let the chips fall where
may with respect to that."
re:

(Tr. 203-204).

th::

(See later discussio,.

proffer of proof in connection with this testimony).

Mr. &

did not deny making that statement to Mr. Marsh, although he con·
ently couldn't "recall" such statement.

(Tr.

352).

In testimoni

of GASSER which appears embarassing at first glance, but in sub;
does not impair his evidence or his legal position, GASSER askej
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oo~E

not to tell Mr. Henriod of the value of the mobile home park

as demonstrated by an appraisal of Mr. Kiepe

(Tr. 115).

GASSER

fult keenly the conflict which Mr. Henriod didn't want to face

(or

escape) and believed that the value of the park necessary for the
loan (and to satisfy HORNE if he should join the loan) was so high
that the Skankey agreement might be upset if Mr. Henriod/ realized
the full value.

HORNE, for selfish interests, was willing to with-

hold that information from his own attorney.
10.

The squeeze-play on the GASSERS became downright

difficult when the threats from Mr. Henriod were intensified.
GASSER asked for another weekend after June 29,

When

1973 to think about

HORNE's demands for 50% and the imminent closing of the loan, Mr.
Henriod told him, "No, you have no more time, if you don't sign
today my clients \-lill foreclose and there will be nothing left of
the situation."

(Tr. 88 and 147).

Mrs. GASSER, recalling similar

threats from Mr. Henriod, characterized them as leading her to
believe that they would "lose everything" by Mr. Henriod' s foreclosure.

(Tr. 174).

She specified that although Mr. Henriod was

making the threats, they were really for HORNE's benefit.

(Tr. 187).

Although Mr. Henriod denied threatening that the GASSERS
"would lose everything"

(Tr. 306), which was probably the GASSERS'

~uacterization of the import of his threats, Mr. Henriod clearly

stated his threats in response to questions by Mr. Halgren:
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"Q

A

What I 1 m talking about, the critical time now when
he has either got to fish or cut bait, he either
has to get this loan finalized or he loses the
whole thing.
I think in the 28th -- on the 28th, I think I said
1
If you don 1 t come up with the money by the 2 Bth or
29th, now, that it will be necessary for me to foreclose. 1
I had already given the written notice to
that effect on the llth.

* * *
Q

Well, you were threatening to foreclose_

A

Yes, I was threatening to foreclose but that was
only part of his assets."
(Tr. 336-337).
The nature of the foreclosure is also clarified by fu.

Henriod, with emphasis showing that his threats were not mere idlE
talk:

"Q
A

(By Mr. Nielsen)
was done?

Will you state when and what

About March of 1973 we commenced an action against
Mr. Gasser and in the State of Montana to foreclose
the interest that had been assigned to secure the
payment of the $225,000. Also prepared pleadings
which were not filedto foreclose the interest in
the Layton trailer park."
(Tr. 337).
It is evident that Mr. Henriod meant business.

And he

was thus in a strong position to tell the GASSERS that they must
go along with the HORNE demands or his already-commenced foreclos~·
in Montana would be completed and his about-to-be-commenced foreclosure in Utah would be implemented.

11.

·
·
t
It 1s
1ncongruen

f or

Mr. Henr1.' od to be involved

in the squeeze-play on the GASSERS as he otherwise admitted that"
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~dn't

really care where the money for the Skankey Group came from.

In the same regard, he was not sufficiently concerned about the
appraisal on the park to ask Horne for a copy of the appraisal.
(Tr. 317). His reasons:
Did you have any particular reason why you were
not concerned with the appraised value of this
property?

"Q

A

My concern was getting the $468 or $470,000, plus
the $225 for my clients, wherever Mr. Gasser got
his money was of no concern to me except that he
got it and paid it."
(Tr. 318).
12.

The threats constituting duress on the GASSERS as-

s~ed

a different but sharper focus when both Mr. Henriod and

HORNE

put pressures on American Savings

GASSER

matter.

&

Loan relative to the

When GASSER was seeking to restructure the loan

without any need of HORNE's signature, he had preliminary indications
from American Savings that an interest rate of 9% may be hard to sell
with the GASSERS alone on the documents, but with a 10% rate (which
GASSER

agreed to pay) the loan would be more marketable.

The question of using a higher rate loan with the GASSERS

(Tr. 124).
(but not

the HORNES) is connected closely with the demands made by HORNE
and

~lr.

Henriod that American Savings go along with them and not

negotiate further with the GASSERS.

The import of the evidence

is that American Savings was willing to make a loan on an increased
rate to the GASSERS alone without the HORNES and without a precommitted sale to another financial institution.

No written com-

mitment to that effect was ever finalized, however, by reason of
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During the testimony of Mr. Bradshaw, President of American Savt

& Loan, the following dialogue occurred:
"Q

(By Mr. Halgren)
lvell, was there any discussion
relative to a change in the rate of interest
relative to this loan?

A

There was discussion about a change in the rate
of interest.

Q

Was the change up or down"
(Objection by the Court to leading question) --

Q

All right, How was the change?

A

It was to be changed upward so the loan could be sold.

Q'

And what importance was that that the loan could
be sold?

A

Well, there was a lot more people in the market
when the rate is high and they overlook certain
things when it's a profitable loan.

Q

What was Mr. Gasser's position with regards to any
increase in the loan rate?

A

He was willing to have it increased."

(Tr. 240)

Further testimony of Mr. Bradshaw suggested the pressures his ins:
tution felt:
"Q

A

(By Mr. Halgren)
Do you know of any thing that
arose in the business of American Savings that
caused American Savings and Loan not to increase
the loan rate to ten percent?
Well, as previously stated it got to be a hassle
and got to be involved with two sides, I honestly
don't think I was ever threatened.
You said threatened, I don't think I was ever threatened or anything
like that, but it got uncomfortable to the point.
where it was kind of messy.
We talked it over w1th
our counsel, he advised us not to raise it, not to
be involved."
(Tr. 241).
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"Q

(By Mr. Halgren)
Did you have any conversation
with either Mr. Horne or Mr. Henriod relative to
their position on an increase in the loan rate.

A

can't remember the specific exact conversation,no,
can't, but I know that gist of it, that we learned
both sides and the problems, and that's why we
backed down.

Q

So because of that you kept Mr. Dave Horne's name
on the loan application and included him as a party
in the transaction, is that correct?

A

I

I
I

think he isn't a party to the transaction, is he?"

(Tr. 242).
The first statements above evidence that American Savings
would have gone forward with the GASSERS on a loan with increased
rate, without the HORNES, if American Savings hadn't backed down.
After learning the problems concerning Mr. HORNE and Mr. Henriod,
however, American Savings backed down.

Even without strong threats

from them, it is obvious that American Savings terminated its further
discussions with the GASSERS as a result of the HORNE-Henriod
pressures.

The trial judge characterized these activities as

"Interfering with a contractual relationship"

(Tr. 2 3 8) and decided

~at such activities may give rise to a tort liability but should

not be used to declare the agreement null and void.

Appellants

here urge that such "interference" is part of the duress on the
GASSERS which should properly be used as a basis for invalidating
the HORNE Agreement.

Mr. Bradshaw's last answer quoted above

evidences that HORNE was not on the operative documents, and he
'dOndered why Mr. Halgren described HORNE as a "party" to the
transactions.
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During an earlier dialogue as part of Mr. Bradshaw's
testimony, the court erroneously refused to allow Mr. Halgren
to use Mr. Bradshaw's deposition as a means of refreshing recollection and clarifying matters on which the witness was unclen
by the time of trial.

(See later discussion of the legal points

concerning use of depositions).

The depositions should have bee;

used as an aid to the court in understanding the full import of
Mr. Bradshaw's testimony.

The deposition testimony of Mr. Howar:

C. Bradshaw, under date of October 9, 1973, clearly spells out
both the interest rate consideration and the pressures from HOP.:!: '
or Mr. Henriod, under the interrogation by HORNE's counsel,
Cook, then affiliated with Mr. Henriod's office:
"Q

(By Mr. Cook)
Would you state in a general way
what the loan market was doing between February of
'73 and July of '73 with respect to loans of this
nature regarding interest rates and salability of
loans of this size? Did that trigger the right
things?

A

The loans, of course, were increasing, drastically
increasing.

Q

Interest rates?

A

Interest rates.
And the loan became unsalable and
we asked Mr. Gasser if he would increase the loan
so it could be sold. And this benefits me and it
evidently benefited him, too, that he didn't have
to--he thought maybe he wouldn't have to work with
Mr. Horne so he was immediately agreeable so th~t
I could get it up to a rate where I could sell 1t
and he could live without Dave Horne.
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Q

Now, let's see, the original rate was nine percent
as of February 21, 1973, and so to put this thinq
in a time frame, at what point were you having conversations with Mr. Gasser about increasing that
to ten?

A

I'm not sure of the dates.
two after that date.

Q

March, April?

A

Yes, I think so.

Q

And you say he was agreeable to raising the rate
of interest?

A

Yes.

Q

Then was something done to raise the rate of interest or to attempt to get a commitment to purchase
that?

A

Yes. The market at that
sold at the ten percent,
in this big dog fight so
know how we could change

Q

Backed off from selling it?

A

No. Backed off--I haven't anything to sell until
I can get a new note and mortgage signed up, you
see, and I'd have to negotiate a new note and mortgage. At this time this thing kind of exploded or
we could see it building up so our attorney, Ed
Clyde, said, 'Let's not mess with it.'

Q

In terms of --

A

Changinq the rate.

Q

No.

A

Okav.

Q

You were saying to Gasser:
'Would you agree to a
higher rate of interest,' and he was saying, 'Yes'?

I'm sure a month or

He was agreeable.

time it could have been
but we didn't want to get
we backed off. I don't
it.

Do you understand that?

Well--
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A

I will.
And if there had been--if that's all there
were to it, I'm sure this loan today would have
been sold, the new note would have been made at ten
percent and recorded, and so on and so forth, and
the loan could have been sold and been done with.
But in the meantime, Dave Horne called up or Joe
Henriod or somebody and said,'Look, we're in the
middle of this thing.
We have rights, and you better
not do this.'
And I reported this to our attorney
on the board of directors and he said, 'Forget it,
don't mess with it,it's too messy.'

Q

You mean rights in the loan commitment at the lesser
rate or whatever?

A

Yes.
He said leave it alone.
Let's let them fighl
it out and we'll go from there."
(pp. 22-24).
13.

Exhibit 8-P is a set of escrow instructions prepa:

by Mr. Henriod in connection with the loan closing at American
Savings.

Most of that document consists of instructions concerni;

handling of funds and instruments relating to Dr. Skankey and the
Skankey Group, and Mr. Henriod expressly states therein that he is
attorney for them.

However, Mr. Henriod also provided instr~t~

for the benefit of the HORNES as if he were also acting on their
behalf.

Paragraph III details handling of documents for the HOR:;'

and relating to their interests.

The Addendum to Escrow Instruct.

part of Exhibit 8-P, slightly revises the instructions fort~
benefit of the HORNES by advising the escrow agent:
. you are further instructed to hold the
Deed from Gasser and Freda to David M. Horne and Jeanne
M. Horne and to record said Deed only in the event
American Savings & Loan Association requests you to do
SQ.

II
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~~

instructions relate only to the interests of the HORNES and

~re

not a necessary part of the Skankey Group instructions.

Ap-

rellants strongly assert that Mr. Henriod was knowingly acting as
counsel for the HORNES in preparation of escrow documents for the
~~

closing and that his position as counsel for them and as

counsel for the Skankey Group and Dr. Skankey provided an opportunity
to make demands on the GASSERS which constituted duress.
When the foregoing facts are viewed against the law pertaining to business duress, the Court must concur with Appellants'
~sitions

herein stated.

This Court has clearly stated the law

regarding business or economic duress in prior decisions.

In Fox

v. Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763 (1951), the court reversed
the lower court's findings of duress and determined that no duress
existed in that particular case.

However, after an historical

review of the deve loprnents of the law pertaining to duress, the
governing propositions of law were announced:
"To summarize, then, there have been four distinct
phases in the development of the law regarding duress:
1.

The ancient rule limiting it to certain specified acts;

2.

The enlargement to include any threats, but
requiring the 'brave man' test;

3.

The relaxing of this rule to apply the 'man
of ordinary firmness' test; and

4.

The modern rule that any wrongful act or threat
which actually puts the victim in such fear as
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to compel him to act against his will constitutes duress.
We approve this modern rule."

* * *

(227 P. 2d at 766).

The court in Fox thereafter discussed the difficulti 2 s
of subjective tests for determining duress and the
that an objective standard be used.

desirabili~

Describing the rule of law

as "modern and liberal", the court nevertheless stated that the
or threat constituting duress must be wrongful, and approvingly
quoted the Restatement of the Law of Contracts:
"Acts or threats cannot constitute duress unless
they are wrongful, even though they exert such pressure
as to preclude the exercise of free judgment. But acts
may be wrongful within the meaning of this rule though
th~ are not criminal or tortious or in violation of
a contractual duty * * * * 227 P. 2d at 766.
(Emphasis
added).
The applicable law was further discussed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Reliable Fruni ture Company v. Fidelity

&

Guam:

Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (19611
In a suit against an insurance company for losses covered by a L
ness interruption policy, plaintiff claimed fraud and duress bee
settlement of one claim could not be effected without the insure"
agreeing to settlement of a claim under another policy for an
objectionably low amount.

This court reversed and remanded for

trial the lower court's summary judgment for the insurer.
court stated:
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"In determining whether the plaintiff is entitled
to redress, it is not essential that his contentions
of fraud and duress be considered separately. They can
and should be considered on the basis that he contends
they existed, intermingled together. *** If we accept
the facts as plaintiff contends them to be, as we are
obliged to do on this review, we must assume not only
that the plaintiff was in economic distress, but that
defendant knew this and took advantage of him by falsely
representing that money belonging to the plaintiff could
not be delivered to him, and wrongfully refusing to deliver it unelss plaintiff would also accept the prorfered settlement on defendant's policy, which resulted
in compelling plaintiff to accept the latter settlement
against his will .
" 398 P.2d at 687.
The foregoing statement from the court gives rise to
some compelling inferences regarding the facts of the case at Bar.
The Reliable case was reviewed again after trial and reported at 24 Utah 2d 93, 466 P.2d 368 (1970).
firmed the judgment favoring defendant.

There the court af-

The facts did not support

the claimed duress because plaintiff obtained one check and cashed
it and had nine days with the other (disputed) check before cashing

161)

oec:

it, thus leading the court to conclude that whatever coercion may
have existed to compel acceptance of the offer ceased to exist
~fure cashing the second check.

But the principles of law regarding

duress were not changed by the court.

Appellants here submit that

the duress from Mr. Henriod on behalf of HORNE continued right down

or

€

to the closing of the American Savings transaction late on June 29,
197 3.

Other courts have found duress, as a matter of fact, and
have applied similar principles of law with additional nuances of
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analysis.

In Terrel v. Duke

City Lumber Company, Inc., 86

:~o:.i.

405, 524 P.2d 1021 (1974), the court used the terminology "econo:
compulsion" rather than "duress" and dealt with the subject unde:
classical tort theory.

The facts are lengthy and difficult

but the court's decision has merit in its legal reasoning

~n

a~~

fact that duress was found to exist sufficient to affirm' a judgme
for damages.

Using the normal elements of a tort, including a

duty of care, a breach of that duty, causation and damages, wet:
late that court's reasoning into the facts at Bar as follows:

(1) Duty of Care:

Mr. Henriod and HORNE had the supec

bargaining position as the sole effective source of
by the GASSERS

somethi~~

(the loan) to avoid a severe economic loss.

Thus,

they had the duty to use that position reasonably to assure t~
weaker parties

(the GASSERS) a reasonable choice of alternatives.

(2) Breach of Duty:

The straightforward threat to fore·

close on all of the GASSERS' property if they did not sign the
HORNE Agreement represented an unreasonable use of a superior
bargaining position, especially where GASSER might have obtained
a loan at higher rate without the HORNES and where ultimately th•
subject loan was closed at American Savings, who sold it to anot:·
investor, without a higher rate and \vi thout the necessity of the
HORNES' signatures.
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(3) Causation:
~SSERS

1

The direct and proximate cause of the

execution of the HORNE Agreement and closing the subject

loan with an alternative set of documents was the threats of HORNE
and

~lr.

Henriod regarding foreclosure. As the GASSERS told Mr.

Marsh, they were "forced" to go through with the loan and the
HORNE Agreement.

(Tr. 214).

(4) Damages:

Although money damages are not sought by

ilie GASSERS here, suffering the loss to the HORNES of SO% of a
mobile home park worth $1,688,000.00

(Ex. 21-P), and subject to

mrtgages of about $1,200,000.00 in the aggregate, without receiving compensation therefor, constitutes serious economic deprivation
to the GASSERS.
The Terrel case analysis is not dissimilar to the Utah
1

Court s reasoning in Fox and Reliable, supra.

The objective stand-

ards by which this court judges wrongful conduct, i.e., conduct of
such nature and under such circumstances as to control the will,
achieves the same result as describing the wrongful conduct in terms
of duty, breach and causation.

Whichever words are used to describe

the wrong, HORNE 1 s actions, through Mr. Henriod , constitute interference with the free right to seal a new contract with American
S~ings.

As the lower court suggested (Tr. 239) the "contractual

interference" must be viewed as a breach of duty resulting in a
void agreement between the HORNES and the GASSERS.
A different semantic gloss on the same theme is seen
ln ~brenner
Hyerson
167
P.2d
15 (Colo.
1946).
There
duress
Sponsored by thev.
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
provided by the
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and remanded a judgment for defendant in a case whereby plaintJ:'
T~ ~.

alleged duress in sale of real estate through defendant.
stated, inter alia:

"Under the circumstances of the parties her:

as established without contradiction, actual misrepresentatioos
were not necessary in order to establish constructive fraud."
(167 P.2d at 20).

The inequality in the Dittbrenner case wu

of experience differential between the parties.
in this

The inequality

case is one of financial, or control of the means

taining financial relief.

~

of~

While Appellants here have never ck:

actual and deliberate misrepresentations by HORNE or Mr. Henrioc,
under the rule of Di ttbrenner, wrongful conduct can be inferred
if the result of threats is duress leading to involuntary actiw
It is important to observe that the means of economic

L

duress suffered by the GASSERS here was not just a staterne~~

~

the rights of Mr. Henriod' s other clients to resort to judicial

cc

means of collecting matured debts.

li

don't pay, I ' l l foreclose".

This is not

merely "If you

Such threat to collect by laHfulm::

a just debt due would not constitute actionable duress.
involves facts far beyond such ordinary conduct.
an attorney who "held all the aces".
and the Skankey Group.

The cas

sa

Here we witne:

\r

He represented Dr. Skanke;

If he did not represent HORNE (and we

submit he did), he placed himself in a position to influence HO'
and control events bearing on HORNE's interests
example).

sh

(Ex. 8-P, for

Thus, by demanding rightful relief for one groug thr:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ber

th,

let

-33A-

f'

a wrongful demand that the GASSERS sign the HORNE Agreement, he

0,,

utilized unfairly a superior bargaining position as the HORNES'

ro

de~

me

representative, to coerce the GASSERS' conduct for the

HORNES'

benefit.

~~to

condone it, would result in a $300,000.00 windfall to the

:JORNES

for which they neither paid consideration nor suffered

any detriment.
1b·

0
ld,

Moreover, the wrongful conduct, if this court

The flagrant unfairness of the proposition is

revolting to our sense of justice.
Accordingly, it is submitted that Appellants have demonstrated the legal and factual grounds on which the court should,
and must, reverse the judgment.

OC.t

Having discussed the operative facts and the governing
law concerning duress, Appellants now provide a brief discussion

,f

concerning certain evidentiary points mentioned earlier.

cl

concerns the use of the deposition of Mr. Bradshaw, which was pub-

IU

lished without objection during trial.

rn;c

shaw did not respond to Mr. Halgren's questions at trial with the

;as:

same clarity as shown by his deposition, counsel attempted to permit

1es

rir. Bradshaw to refresh his recollection from page 23 of his Octo-

keY

ber 1973 deposition.

(Tr. 232).

The first

When Mr. Brad-

In response to objections, the court held

that it was not proper to hand the deposition to the witness and
HOP'

let him read it.

After counsel attempted to read parts of the

deposition into the record, the court sustained an objection to
hiC
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that procedure.

In such rulings, the court erre>d.

The depositi'

should have been used either to refresh the recollection of

t~

witness or, if the memory remained unrefreshed, to constitute
substantive evidence.

Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of

Eviden~

provides:
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence
and inadmissible except:
(1) a prior statement of a witness, if the judge finds
that the witness had an adequate opportunity to perceive
the event or condition which his statement narrates,
describes or explains, provided that (a) it is inconsistent with his present testimony, or (b) it contains
otherwise admissible facts which the witness denies having
stated or has forgotten since making the statement, or
(c) it will support testimony made by the witness in
the present case when such testimony has been challenged;"
[Emphasis added).
The testimony proffered by Mr. Bradshaw's deposition,
quoted at length in the factual discussion paragraph numbered 11
above, was essential as part of the evidence demonstrating

t~~

ful conduct of Mr. llenriod for his client HORNE under the rules
announced in Fox v. Piercey, supra.

Such relevant and admissibl-

evidence should not have been excluded by the trial judge a~~
susceptible of consideration by this court on appeal.

Rule 6J(c

of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly allows the use of depos:
as an exception to the hearsay rule under certain conditions,
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:is

including the circumstances where the adverse party was present
~d

cross-examined in the prior deposition testimony.
Further confirming Appellants' position is Rule 5 of the

Utah Rules of Evidence, which expressly permits the setting aside
of a verdict or finding when the excluded evidence would probably
have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different
verdict or finding.
HORNE and/or Mr.

Mr. Bradshaw's testimony about pressure from

Henriod and the resulting "backing down" of American

Savings from other negotiations with the GASSERS unequivocally
supports the wrongfulness of Respondents' actions and the consequent necessity to reverse the lower court's findings and judgment.
Another evidentiary matter having great significance and
adding to the grounds for believing the judgment would be altered
but for evidence wrongfully excluded is the proffer of proof through
Mr. Ralph Marsh.
.,.

When Mr. Halgren asked Mr. Marsh about a conversa-

tion he had with Mr. Henriod, the court sustained an objection on
the basis that it was hearsay as to HORNE.

(Tr. 203).

In a proffer

of proof, Mr. Halgren elicited from Mr. Marsh testimony concerning
the conflict of interest to which Mr. Henriod admitted.

204).

(Tr. 203-

When Mr. Halgren asked for a ruling on his proffer, the

court replied,

"You may proceed back on regular".

(Tr. 204).

This

statement of the court leaves unclear whether the proffered testimony

1~as

admitted or stricken.

If the testimony was admitted,
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then it stands as substantive evidence against the Respondents,
their counsel.

If stricken, such was wrongful, for the test~~

is clearly admissible under Rule 5 and Rule 63(1) of the
Evidence, quoted above.

Ru~s

In that event, Mr. Marsh's hearsay teo:

mony at trial relates to the prior statements of Mr. Henriodas
a witness. which are admissible as inconsistent with his testic:
at trial.

POINT III
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO OUTRIGHT REVERSAL OF THE JUDGHENT,
APPELLANTS SEEK REMAND FOR A TRIAL BY JURY WHICH WAS
WRONGFULLY DENIED.
During pendency of the case below, counsel for Defenc
requested a non-jury trial as of February 22, 1974. (R. 132).

r

case was set for trial October 11, 1974 and continued to Octobt:
1974

(R. 156).

Prior to the trial setting, Mr. Halgren, thM

counsel for Plaintiffs, paid the $15.00 jury fee on Septemb~r
1974.

The case was then continued again to February 5, 1975.

(R. 155).

Although the notices of continuance do not clearb

state, the circumstances clearly indicate that the parties exP'
a iury trial.

On February 3, 1975, counsel for Defendants fil'

a motion to strike the case from the jury calendar (R. 214) ·
motion was granted by order of February 10, 1975
·
t 10n
·
o f reasons f or sue h or der .
d es1gna

(R. 220) lvitr.

The case •·Jas
continued
'
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from February 5, 1975 to February 24, 1975 (R. 219) and again
to June 25, 1975
June 26, 1975.

(R.

222).

Trial commenced before Judge Baldwin

(R. 261).

The possible grounds for denial of the jury trial, based
on the motion to strike, are discussed as follows:
1.

"No demand for a jury has been made as required by

Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice for the Third Judicial District
court."

This ground was not well taken.

Rule 15 provides for

jury trial upon filing of a written demand and the payment of the
required statutory fee, and the demand and fee must be filed at
least ten (10) days prior to trial.

Payment of the jury fee on

September 23, 1974 with trial set for October 11, 1974, and knowledge by Defendants' counsel, constitutes sufficient compliance
with that rule.

The case was actually set by the clerk on the jury

calendar prior to the motion of Defendants, and it is obvious that
~fundants'

counsel had notice of payment of the jury fee, as a

result of which the court is entitled to assume that a demand
~<1as

made (but not in the record) or that counsel was nevertheless

given notice which would be a substitute for the written demand.
2.

"Failure of the Plaintiffs to comply with the provi-

sions of Rule 3 8 (b) , Utah Rules of Ci vi 1 Procedure."

That Rule

Preserves the right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or as given by statute, and permits a party to demand a trial
by jury by paying the statutory fee and serving upon the other
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parties a demand therefor in writing.

~ti

The rule was complied

in the same manner as Rule 15 of the Third District Court, discus
above.
3.

"Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial under

the constitution and the statutes of the State of Utah, particuk
S~t

Article 8, Section 9, Constitution of the State of Utah, and
78-21-1, UCA, 1953, as amended."

The statutory provision cited

preserves the right to trial by jury, "in actions for the recover
of specific real or personal property, with or without damages ...
(Sec. 78-21-1).

Where the GASSERS seek to recover from the HOR'::

the 50% interest in Hillgate Terrace claimed by the HORNES

a~

embodied in an unrecorded deed, such action is for the recovery
of specific real property as contemplated by that statute.

Thus,

the GASSERS were entitled to a trial by jury.
The constitutional provision cited does not impair the
right to jury trial.

Article 8 (VIII), Section 9 actually deals

with appeals, and deals with cases in equity or at law.

It see:

to be the position of Defendants that the complaint seeks equiti
not legal relief, and thus a trial by jury is improper.

Yet it

painfully evident from the matters heretofore argued in this br:
that substantial questions of fact were raised by the pleadings
the evidence.

The complaint seeks a restraining order and a de:

adjudicating that the HORNE Agreement is null and void.
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The counterclaim seeks damages plus specific performance and restraining orders.

(R.lO)

A trial concerning rights under a disputed

agreement (lack of consideration and duress) and the counterclaim
for damages raises factual issues within the province of a jury.
a:

A jury can decide issues of fact even in equity cases.
wurt can review both fact and law in such cases.

And this

Section 78-2-2,

UCA, 1953, as amended.

CONCLUSION

NL

Appellants submit that this court should

reverse the

judgment of the lower court and order judgment for Appellants
on the grounds:

IS,

1.

This court has the power on appeal to review the trial

judge's findings and substitute its own, where the evidence would
support different findings.
in the brief.

This proposition has not been argued

It is so fundamental that extensive citations are

not necessary.

See Rule 7 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

ti

2.

The Agreement between the GASSERS and the HORNES

.t

(Ex. 6-P) is null and void for lack of consideration.
3.

The Agreement between the GASSERS and the HORNES

is of no effect because execution thereof by the GASSERS was induced

by the threats and other circumstances constituing business or
).

economic duress.

such duress deprived the GASSERS of visible alter-

native methods of refinancing the subject mobile home park or otherwise obtaining financial relief.

As a result, execution of the
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4.

The HORNEJS are not entitled to receive a 50% inter,

in the mobile home park without consideration, as a matter of law
or equity.
Alternatively,

Appellants seek remand for jury trial

which was erroneously denied.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

By

c;;;;_~tftfb---:-.
Don B. Allen

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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